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Hpcxd.mtoa
To begin a philosophical endeavor with a consideration of

its ends might seem odd, but it is really the end of this work

that prompted me to begin. The end I have in mind, the facet of
experience I have been thinking about, did not come to me through
a consideration of art. Or, to be more exact, my recognition of
this part of experience was not a product of a consideration of
art. I think back about •Y relations with people in the past and
.

--

I begin to realize it was there that this project actually began.
People have always been quite interesting to me. I think of

- .. -- - - - ·------------·

time spent in the cafes in Santa Fe watching the tourists and,

even more interesting, the natives walk by. It always seemed to
me that I could, by just looking at them as they walked by,
discover what sort of person they were--what category of people
they fit into. I realize now that much of my interaction with
others is prefaced by this sort of categorization. I see a man on
the sidewalk outside the grocery store and he becomes •a homeless
person• in my mind; the woman with the grand hairdo driving the
cadillac becomes "the rich woman.• And, most of the time these
categories work fairly well at doing the job of predicting these
people's actions. I expect the homeless man to ask me for money,
and the rich woman to wear a fur coat.

I was formerly quite comfortable being ignorant of my

thinking about people in this way. Life was quite easy as I knew
what to expect from people, if a little boring for the same

reason. In the midst of what I now know to be delusion, though,

there was a problem. I could not fit myself into any one of these
categories. Though I searched diligently to find some •type"

which seemed to reflect myself, my search was fruitless. Upon

placing myself into a category I would find qualities about me
that did not allow me to be just

•a rock climber• or "a future

philosopher.• so, not being one to get overly worked up over
trying to fit an ideal, I gave up, and upon giving up I

discovered two important things. First, I saw all around me

people trying to place themselves into groups as I had done, and
I recognized that, as useful as they might be, ay categories of

people would always fall far short of the people themselves. Jus-f

as I could not fit myself into any of my groups, so they too were

people who always eluded categorization--no matter how they tried

to avoid this. They behaved in a certain manner in order to be

seen as being this or that sort of person, but upon getting to

know them more closely I began to realize that they, like myself,

had aspects of themselves which distinguished them from their
type.

What I recognized, it should be pointed out, was not that my

categories of people are uaeles.s; as I said, we use this sort of

thinking for good and easily identifiable reasons. In thinking

about people as instances of categories, though, there seems to

be a corresponding neglect of a fundamental aspect of their

- -·- -

nature. That is, we ignore the way in which, if we pay close
enough attention to them, they elude our categorical

descriptions. This other dimension of people is at once elusive

and strikingly present in any encounter with another person. Just
as a person seems to be fitting the categorical mold we have

created for them, they will do the unexpected and leave us

wondering how we could have ever thought of them merely as an

instance of a category.

It is this relationship that I want to talk about in the

context of art. In thinking about my relationships with people I

began to realize that the way art compelled me had something

closely to do with- the way people interested to me. I could

describe a�l my favorite artworks in detail, as I often did in

essays for various courses in college. And yet these descriptions
had something of a hollowness to them. I would often be excited

about a new poem I had read and would try to give a sense of it

to a friend. Upon doing this I was invariably disappointed with
my description of the poem. Though it might seem to me to say

pertinent things about the artwork, I always had the feeling that

it fell short of capturing the artwork itself. There seemed to be

something ineffable about the poem that my repeated attempts at

description could not encompass. And so I was left wondering, as

is often the case when coming upon something philosophically
interesting. I wondered how my descriptions of the artwork

related to the thing I saw there in front of me. I wondered what
it was about the artwork that eluded these descriptions; could

this elusiveness be a property of the artwork or was it a quality

of my experience of the artwork? Perhaps most importantly, What

is it about this elusiveness that makes the artwork so

compelling? These questions have led me to this project.

I do not propose to do anything magical here. I will

say at the outset that I wonder now as much as before about these
questions. I have come to a more clear understanding of what

these questions mean and how they might begin to be answered, but
this does not mean that artworks or people have ceased to have
this character. Quite the opposite, it seems that the more I

understand the nature of my relation to the artwork, the more I
realize that it is this elusiveness that will always mark my

esthetic experience. Since it is in direct experience that this

tension between what is and-is not-dlscursivly accessiable--

becomes most evident, I will begin with the artworks themselves.

Chapter 1

The Artworks:

Descriptions and THAT.Dess
The sea wa• not a mask. Ho more was she.
The song and the water were not medl.yed •ound
Even if what ahe •ang waa what ahe heard

I begin my project with a dilemma. I have close at hand two
artworks which have become old friends. The first is Wallace
Stevens' poem "The Idea of Order at Key West.• The second is the
Cello Concerto by Dvorak. I am especially fond of the recording

by the Chicago Orchestra with Jacqueline Dupre as soloist--though
the difference between the various performances is a subject that
will soon prove to-raise numerous difficult questions.
The dilemma I face is this: should I begin with the very
particular impressions the works have made.upon me, or with
something more like the critical analysis one is accustomed to
finding in philosophical _reflection about art? In one sense,
beginning with-the parti�ular J.apresaions of the poem gives
insight into how the mo�e abstr&ct criticism is generated. on the
other hand, the critical analysis is what is most often
represented as being the •right• way to delineate the meaning of
a work, and it would be useful to see exactly how these "right•
interpretations relate to the artwork. In addition, it seems that
I need something of the artworks down on paper in order to make
sense of saying what sort of impression the artworks make on me.
The thing to keep in mind, though, is that the critical analysis
of the two works is a product of the more particular images the
pieces inspire. This will prove important later.
l

correct, assumption would be that what we have here is a woman

singing by the rolling waves of the sea. And not in any idealized
sense either. When-one sings by the sea (I would imagine) the

result is not a pretty blending of sound. Indeed one would almost

have to be screaming to be heard over the sounds of the waves,
and this seems to be the situation that Stevens is suggesting
when he says that her voice echoes the •grinding water and

gasping wind.• This point made, it would be too simple to say

that the singer and the ocean are just very distinct. They are
distinct, but yet the singer sings •what she heard.• Somehow,

even here when the distinction between the singer and song is the
strongest, they do not easily separate completely. And yet •it

was she and not-the aea·we heard.•

. - - ·-·

-

But, undoubtedly, the song that •we• are hearing is much

more than a singer's voice. It is more than just the sound of the

ocean. If it were either of these things, the sound would just be
•sound alone.• The distinction between the singer and the ocean

disappears in the fourth stanza. If it were only one· or the other

we hear •however clear, it would have been deep air,/ The heaving
speech of air, a summer-sound/ Repeated in a summer without end/

And sound alone.• In the first section the singer's voice itself

is the center of attention, it is what we listen to and hear the

sea reflected in. But in the fourth stanza we realize that it is

not just the sea we hear, or·the echoing of the sea-in the song.

What we hear is •more even than her voice and ours, among/ the
meaningless plungings of water and the wind,/ Theatrical

distances, bronze shadows heaped/ On high horizons, mountainous
3

atmospheres/ Of sky and sea.• Suddenly we have lost the

distinction between the singer and the sea; they have blended
together to produce something that is beyond the grandeur of

nature. What is it we are hearing then, if it is not just the

sound of the song or sea? We are left at the end of the fourth

stanza not really knowing anymore what it is we are hearing--if
indeed we are hearing at all. The distinctness that is so

comfortable in its simplicity has melted into a state of
indeterminacy that elicits the desire for resolution.

We look in the fifth stanza for some answers to the

questions that the poem seems to pose, -but a resolution, in the

sense of definition, is not to be found in the poem. In the•fifth
stanza the idea that the singer is making the world with her song

seems once again to suggest that her song is what we hear; •As we

beheld her striding there alone,/ [we] knew that there never was
a world for her/ Except the one she sang, and singing, made.•

Perhaps the ocean , •Whatever self-it·had,·became the self/ That

was her song, for she was the maker.• To think this resolves the
questions as to the relation between the singer and ocean,

though, is to overlook what these lines are saying. She defines
the ocean with her song, but in some sense we have to realize
that her song defines her as well. As she walks along the sea

singing, she is part of the world that she is creating, so in
some sense she is being created along with the sea. And- as we

know that the song embodies the spirit of the sea, it seems that
it is the voice of the sea that defines her as she defines the
sea. This is the "both• that I suggested in the beginning. In
4

some sense the tension in the poem arises out of the

possibilities that are presented in the first two sections.

Perhaps the voice of the singer and the sea are separate, and

perhaps they are in some way the same. If these two ideas were

chords, then playing them together would yield something like the
tension that is suggested in the fifth stanza, where the

resulting sound is interplay of the two but something itself
distinct.

It is no accident that I mention chords here, for it is at

this point that I want to begin to talk about the second artwork.
It was more than just chance that lead ae to choose this Dvorak

piece; the similarities between the poem and Dvorak's concerto is
striking. It is in some ways difficult to convey what would make

one say something like this as music is a medium that seems

particularly resistant to discursive description. In another way,
though, I think that something can be conveyed about the
structure of the concerto that will prove helpful to my

continuing discussion. The cello concerto is composed of three

movements that in many ways are aiailar in content to the three

sections of the poem. In the first movement the separation

between the cello and orchestra is pronounced. In the second

movement the cello and orchestration gradually move together to
form, by the end of the movement, an almost undifferentiated

unity. In the last movement there are moments reminiscent of each
of the first two movements, up until the ending--which seems to

make no decision between either a separation or union of the
cello and orchestra.

5

It was suggested to me that the first 110vement of the

concerto was structured something like the stanzas of a poem or
paragraphs in a book, and I think this is accurate. The first

movement is composed of distinct sections composed of either the
orchestra or the cello. In the beginning, for instance, the

orchestra plays several minutes of large chords introducing the

primary theme, but as the cello is introduced the orchestration
is reduced to a very light background. This pattern of •cello

paragraph•/ •orchestration-paragraph• is repeated several times
throughout the movement leading to an especially moving example
of this as the cello introduces the secondary theme in stark

contrast to the preceding voicing of the primary theme by the

orchestra; this succeeds in making the-contrast between the two

elements even more distinct just a few minutes before the end of
the movement.

We know that a shift .has occurred in the beginning of the

second movement as the broad chords of--the first gi-ve-way-to a
gentle •human• woodwind opening. As the cello enters, the

dominant feeling seems to be a switch from the paragraph-like
structure of the first to a mood of sentence blending into
sentence. The cello and the orchestra flow into one another

without actually becoming inseparable. After a bit of point
counterpoint tradeoff, the orchestration erupts quite

unexpectedly into a bit of grandness reminiscent of the first

movement. The gradual moving together of the cello and orchestra
is momentarily foiled by a resistance within the two that

separates them as in the first. This resistance is short lived,
6

though, and soon after they resume the move toward union. This

continues until the first complete silence. The cello breaks this

rest, but immediately upon its entrance one is struck by the fact

that it is not alone. Accompanied by another cello, the soloist

is led into a sort of imbeddedness in the orchestration without a
complete union. We still hear the soloist as separate, but there

are few moments in which the cello is not strongly drawn into the

orchestration.

The third movement continues the sort of point/counter-point

structure, but instead of being made up of cello-point and

orchestra counter-point, the trade off is between sections of
stark separation and closer harmony. In a sense, the third

movement derives its tension from the first two movements by

setting their dominant moods in opposition with each-other. There
seems to be soae force· that is pul�ing the cello and orchestra

together while a siailar force holds thea separate. This _ _

opposition continues until the end-o-f_the concerto without ever

being resolved one way or another. Indeed, the last few minutes

of the piece contain a very beautiful section in which the cello

and the orchestra are strongly-joined, and it is this medley that

grows and becomes the thundering chords of the finale. The third

movement seems to suggest that considering either the cello or
the orchestra, by itself, as centrally important is as

problematic as focusing only on the interplay of the two. The

piece's life is in both of these, and, most importantly, in the

tension between them.

1

This brings me to a note that I feel is necessary after

these two analyses. After a detailed look at each of these
pieces, I think I should note just how beautiful they are
independent of any consideration like the one above. The

tendency, for me anyway, when reading poetry is to focus on the

idea of the poem rather than the sound of it aloud. Reading the
Stevens poem convinces me, though, that much of the joy (for a

lack of a better word) in.the experience of the poem is had in

reading it aloud. The tensions within and between lines makes it

seem to roll off the tongue with a life of its own. Listening to
the concerto is much the same experience, though perhaps even

more so. While a discursive analysis of the poem seems to fall

short of capturing its meaning in i·ts immediacy, at least it is

:made of words. Music always seems at odds with any description in
tenu of language. When I tiea·r music :F aa much more 'inclined· to

listen to the actual sound of the piece, rather than to try and
understand its •meaning.•

•Meaning• will begin to become a more indefinite idea as

things progress, but even here the questions I began with are

beginning to arise. In the poem it seems acceptable to ask for a

meaning and to expect something like the above description. With

music it is not as clear that such a meaning does much to capture

what we see in the work. Given the consideration of the sound of
the poem, though, one begins to wonder whether-·it is well

accounted for in terms of an analytic description either. These

questions are a propo, but before posing them in their full form

it is necessary to return to the artworks to formulate what might

•

be a more immediate experience of the works. In particular I
would like to focus on my early impressions of the cello

concerto. A return to the images which evoked the more abstract

description above will give focus to the questions beginning to
rise.

The first few times I listened to the cello concerto I was

struck with the intensity of the images which the piece called to

mind. In particular the piece brought to mind images of a
afternoon picnic with a friend in a valley surrounded by

mountains. A sort of egg salad and wine affair surrounded by

towering, maybe �now covered, peaks. Given the abstract analysis

above (which, as I will point out is the product of these illages)
it is not hard to see what in the music inspires these images.
The serious minor-chorded theme suggests �o me towering peaks
tinged with the hint-of danger and adversity, whil� the

interweaving of the.cello md orchestra in the second movement

suggests the intimacy of- conversation.
seems
-The
-·- third
------movement
·- - ----- --- ··-- - -�
to draw these images together into a unified experience with its

blending of the moods of the first two movements.

This notion of blending of images is an interesting one for

two reasons. First, it suggests that my impressions of the

concerto are in some important way formulated in terms of ay

general experiences. Mountainous settings are very familiar to
me, and I know well what it feels like to sit in a warm sunny
valley surrounded with snow topped peaks. When I hear a music

that has a majestic quality to it I am usually reminded of this

sort of experience. Similarly, I have had the pleasure of eating
g

dinner in a number of wild places and have talked with fellow
trekkers across the camp stove.

At the same time, though, the music seems to give

•coherence• to my experiences. I cannot remember ever having had

the sort of picnic that Dvorak's concerto suggests to me. I have

had fun picnics, and I have eaten meals in the mountains. But I
have never had the particular picnic in the mountains that the

music called to mind so concretely. My experience of the piece of
music seems to be something like a formulation of my own

experiences by the artwork in a way that I might not have

considered otherwise. And my experience of this blending of my

own experiences seems to be much more than if I

had simply

thought: •picnic in the mountains.• The cello concerto does not

simply suggest a picnic in the mountains to me, it evokes an

experience which may even be more intense than an actual picnic-·

would be.

As I suggested, the notion of meaning has become more

tenuous given this sort of description of my experience of the

artwork. While we are at least somewhat comfortable saying that a

critical analysis might capture the meaning of the poem,

describing the images of a picnic in the mountains as capturing

the meaning of the Dvorak concerto sounds odd--and odd in an odd

way.

The problem is, once again, not that the images are so tied

into my private experience that someone else could not understand

how they might relate to the piece. Listening to the concerto

would, I think, give one an understanding of how it might evoke
10

those images in me. The images can be understood as having to do
with the concerto all right, the problem comes in saying that

they� the meaning of the concerto. But since they are so

obviously a product of my personal experience, it

is not clear how they are related to the •meaning• of the

concerto as something independent of my experience. It seems to

make such a connection I would be assuming Dvorak had such images

in mind while creating the piece and/or the piece would evoke the

same images in another observer. Or worse still, that the meaning
of the artwork is in some sense whatever I want it to be. All of
these possibilities seem unpromising, and the next chapter will

deal· with esthet·rc theories which entail claims like these·. - -- ··· · ·
The word meaning should be sufficiently confused at this

point to allow me to discard it in favor of the notion of import

-a term I am not altogether pleased with, but which holds out· - · .... ;

certain advantages over •meaning•. I wish to use the word import

to refer to the more indistinct notion of meaning that has begun

to develop. By indistinct I mean not to point to any metaphysical

property but only to the fact that that •meaning• seems to refer
to something more specific than the developing notion of import

does. Specifically, I want to use •import• to refer to whatever
it is about the artwork that compels images and ideas in us

similar to the ones I have just laid out. Before turning to

theories that attempt to understand the nature of the import of

an artwork, two of its important qualities need to be elucidated.
First, the import of the artwork is describable in a

number of ways. In using the word •describe• I aean something
11

more like what might be conveyed by the word •descry•; our

descriptions seem to point to, rather than circumscribe, the

artwork. My point in constructing both an abstract analysis was

to make it clear that we can say interesting and accurate things
about the import of an artwork. By accurate here I mean we can

construct accounts of the import of an artwork that take into

careful account the artwork as it is presented to us. My account
of the concerto as embodying a play between the human and the

unknown is generated by the very obvious relation between the
cello and orchestra, a relation that is simply a part of the
structure of the music itself.

Further, the interpretations we formulate in order to

describe our experience of the artwork will always be

categorical. Tpat is,-by their-nature, they always have the

quality of being ab.l•_to_r.efer__t9_.mo:n,_ t!µm the_ p_articular _ ·

artwork in question. I have suggested that it is our experiences

in the world that give ua access to the artwork. When we first

approach the artwork the factor that seeu to draw ws in to it is
our recognition a familiar kind of experience beinq dealt with in
its medium. The key word here is •tind.• OUr experiences, like
the import of the artwork, can be described in teI1DS of

abstracted categories, and these categories seem to be what we

first recognize in the artwork.

To use a very simple example, consider the experience of

fear caused by the unknown. This description, of course, is very

abstract and describes a general class of individual experiences
(any number of individual experiences could be described in this
12

related to the sea near which she sings. As I considered this

analogy, other relations between the two artworks began to fall

into place.

I think specifically about a place in the concerto near the

end of the first movement. In this section the orchestra repeats

the now-familiar theme in the typical broad chords. This leads

into a very moving echoing of the theme by the cello alone. I get
the impression of the cello line almost being squeezed or pushed
out of the richness of the chords that precede it; the contrast

between the two is profound and emphasized. In the poem the

effect is similar, but reversed. As I have said, we are sure at

the beginning of the poem that the singer is a woman standing by

the sea. The forth stanza diffuses the distinction between singer
and sea to the point that they join together in •theatrical

distances.• Where is the singing-now? It is not simply -a11uman
singer or the song of the sea one is left with. In a very real
sense it is both, and the tension between the two ideas seems

essential to be the life of the poem.. Looking back to the

concerto I began to see that a very similar thing could be said
about it. Is the theme really embodied in the orchestra and

echoed by the cello, or is it the other way around? Just as in

the case of thepoem, my answer seema to be •both.• In a sense,

the two demensions of the worts seem dependent upon one another

for their efficacy. Without the ocean and sky, the singer's voice

is empty, and without the cello the orchestra resounds a chord
that is too open and simple to have feeling.

14

From what I have said before about the abstract theme of the

concerto, and the way I have related it to the poem, it seems

that I can make the claill that the theme of the two pieces is

very similar. At their core they both have a tension between the
majestic and grand on the one hand and the distinctly human on

the other. Though, as might be imagined given the subject of the

poem, the images that are evoked by the pieces in me are

apparently different, the similarity between them is apparent. A

picnic in the mountains with a friend (including the towering

peaks) is different and yet strongly similar to the experience of

walking with someone along a beach at night listing to the raging

surf. As a matter of fact, thinking about the experiences in this
abstract way (and even in a more particular fashion) leads me to

group them together when -thi- nking about my experiences as a

whole. This might lead one to believe that in-some way-we might
be able to classify the two works as belonging to the same

category of artwork--a category based on the abstract content of
the import. The two worn might then become something like two

particular instances of the category of art that deals with the

tension between the majestic and the human.

The descriptions of the import are, then, categorial.

Looking at the two artworks I have chosen has shown that our

descriptions of the import can be applied to similar artworks. At
this point, some would say, an end has.been reached; if the

notion that artworks are instances of thematic categories was an
acceptable one then there really would ?Ot be much more to say.

This, though, is not the case. Just as I suggested that it is a
15

fundamental mistake to assume people are nothing more than

instances of categories, so too I think that it is a mistake to
see artworks as merely instantiated categories; it is in the

process of describing the import that we find its other quality:
elusiveness.

There is something about my experience of the artwork which

these categorical descriptions, by their nature, miss. As I sit

here ud write about the two artworks, this sort of formulation

of their relation to one another seems almost acceptable. Once I
leave the actual pieces behind and take up talking about them,

saying that they are instances of a type of import becomes much
easier than when I am actually experiencing the artworks

themselves. But this is where I rely on the artworks-. theaselves.

to make the-point that this sor�.9f un�erstanding, while useful,

and true to part-of their- es.thetic_import, missJa.�_tll_e -�c_tualtty_.
of the artworks.

What is left out of the categorical descriptions is the way

in which the two artworks individuate themselves. In some very

real sense these two pieces of art push away froa each other and
from me in such a way as to make a categorical description of

them fall far short of encompassing them. I have said something

about how they apparently have in common a central tension, but

despite this the two works seem to me very separate. Though I can

say very similar things about both pieces, having both of them in

front of me leaves me with the feeling of the sort of distinction
that one finds between different people. I recognize that two

people might be similar in many respects, and have the sort ot
16

experiences that all humans have, but at the same time it seems
that placing them in the category of •people who have had that
sort of experience•, while making my reaction to them simpler,

denies the recognition of the way they are in themselves. In the
case of the artworks, focusing only on the way they embody a

common theme seems to make a caricature of them that denies the

real complexity of each work. What we are dealing with when we do
this is an approximation of the work; the actuality of it is left
behind when summing up its import in words or experiences.

Categorical descriptions, as I have said, seem to have some

sort of hold upon the import of the work, but to assume that they
are the import ia to miss a fundamental aspect of the artwork.

When I say that my interpretation of the artwork refers to •that•
artwork, •that• does not refer to an instance of the-cype of -

interpretation I have in mind. If this were the case. pointing at

the two artworks with a single- interpretation-in mind, as I have
done, would leave us with the feeling the two were not really

very much different--or only different in the sense that they are

two instances of a sameness. Observing the two pieces will assure

us that this cannot be the case, though. The two pieces, though I

can say similar things about them, stand outside my

categorizations in my experience of them. When I formulate an

abstract analysis of an artwork, I am not describing an instance

of a category, I am describing THAT. And the THATness that marks

my experience of the artwork is not fully captured by my
descriptions.
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Describing this THATness poses nearly as much trouble as

making positive claims about it. In its use I mean to refer to
the feeling we get when our expectations about an artwork are

left unfulfilled by the artwork. Being present in any literature

class will prepare one for the necessity of THATness. It would

seem odd for a literary scholar to assert that he had found th�

correct interpretation of a particular work. It seems a perpetual

part of our study of art that the things we say will always fall

short of giving a true, or absolute meaning of some artwork. The

feeling of our interpretation not being able to define the import
completely is something of a visceral one. Walking along a hall
at night and expecting an open door in front of us might be

something like our forming an interpretation, and bumping our

head against the-closed door- mi-qht be-the feeling of.THATness. __
I am now in the_position-to recount the�two_general

qualities about the artistic import. On one hand I have said a

bit about how the import of the artwork is genuinely describable.

My example of the abstract analysis of the two works and the more
specific images I associate with the concerto show that we can
indeed say something about the import, and that the import has

something to do with our general experience. On the other hand,
there is something about the import that eludes these

descriptions. Because of the necessarily categorical nature of

interpretations, they are unable to account for the import of the

artwork in any absolute sense. our e�perience of this is

THATness--the experience of the artwork being other than our
attempts to define it in terms of categorical descriptions.
11

In the next chapter, I shall take a consideration of three

of the most influential voices in recent esthetic reflection.

While I have learned much from the ideas of Suzanne Langer, R.G.
Collingwood, and John Dewey, I will argue that, for the most

part, these thinkers have ignored the experience of THATness.

Questions about the nature of the import will be mostly questions

about where the import actually is--in the artist, the artwork or
the observer. In thinking about what they have left out of their

systems, a clearer understanding of THATness might be reached. As
it stands now, the unanswered questions are numerous. Questions

as to the ontic standing of discribe-ability and THATness suggest

the deeper question about the nature of the import. At this point
the import might seem to be something like a quality of the

artwork or of the-observer's experience;-the·following-chapter.
will begin to show why this cannot be the case.
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Chapter 2

The Thinkers:

Langer, Co11ing,,ood, Dewey

If it was only the dark voice of the aea
That roae, or even colored by many wave■,
If it was only the outer voice of aky
And cloud, of the sunken coral water-walled
However clear, it would have been deep air
The heavy ■peech of air, a aunaer aound
reapeated in aUJ1111oer without end,
And aound alone

My response to most inquiries into the nature of the import

of an artwork is that they lack a place for THA.Tness. Given what I

have said so far, though, this is hardly a fair response. I have

begun to point to an aspect of my experience not accounted for in
any esthetic theory I have found, but the lack of an account of
THA.Tness is not grounds for dismissing a_theory--at least not

without saying quite a bit more -aboat THATness. To understand the
problems with existing esthetic theories we must work from the

inside out, so to speak. This seems to entail, for the most part,

assuming the import I have begun to talk about is something like a

quality of either the artwork or the artist/observer's experience.
In thinking about the import-in this fashion both �imitations and

alternative formulations of the import begin to become apparent.

I. Suzanne Langer
•A work of art is an expressive form created for our

perception through sense or imagination, and what it expresses is
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human feeling.•l In this statement we can distinguish two of the

central concerns in Langer's esthetics. First, she is committed to

the idea that the artwork is in some sense a symbol. Second, the
•art symbol•, as she refers to it despite much misunderstanding,

represents a piece of human experience or feeling. According to

Langer, the import is just this feeling that is embodied in the

symbol. This description of the import needs to be examined more

closely to find exactly what Langer thinks the import of the work
is.

As Langer points out, the idea of a •symbol• is quite

complex and refers to a number of things. In the barest sense a

symbol is something we use in order to represent some other

thing--be it idea or physical object. A globe is a symbolic

representation of :the earth- and word.a (perhaps) - are representations
of physical objects and more complex ideas.

Just what we mean when

we say that something •represents• something else is the important
concept here. Like the array of types of symbols themselves, the

way symbols represent their objects is similarly varied. Language

is a good(though hotly debated) example. Think of the word •poem.•

This word in the English language symbolizes a sort of literature

which fits a certain type of definition. Langer refers to this type
of symbolism as •discursive form• and points out how important it

is for the function of our daily lives. This portion of our

language is amazingly complex and varied, and the way in-which we
l Langer, Suzanne. •Bxpreaaiven••• and Symbolisa.• A Modem
Book ot Esthetics. Kelvin Rader ed. New York: Holt,
Reinhart, and Winaton, 1970. p241
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use and understand the use of symbols in this way often seems

almost magical. But this is not the only type of symbol we use, and
it is not the type of symbol Langer wants to connect with the
artwork.

Discursive form is useful for a variety of things, but

Langer claims that its usefulness is limited when it comes to

expressing human feeling. •reeling• here is taken in a very broad

sense to include •everything that can be felt, physical sensation,
pain and comfort • • • feeling-tones of a conscious human life•

etc. 2 These types of experiences are not easily captuarble in their
full complexity in terms of a discursive account. Thus anger seems

to be a discursive symbol, but the sentence •1 was angry• is one
that hardly conyeya the nuances of a particularly enraging

situation. For Langer, the expressive form. of the artwork(as

symbol) is able to capture the complexity of this feeling.

Perhaps a good way to think of the difference between these

types of symbols is to think of the relation of a metaphor to

language. In a strict sense, as Langer points out, a metaphor is

not language. It is the use of language to express an idea that

cannot be adequately expressed discursively. A metaphor expresses

an often subtle set of associations and meanings that in a very

real sense lose their effect if made explicit. The metaphor seems

to be able to represent some aspect of thought that defies ordinary
linguistic expression. The import of a metaphor is significantly

more indefinite than that of the discursive form., and yet this does
2 Ibid, 240
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not seem to impair our ability to understand and apply metaphors in
our discourse. Thia same indefiniteness and yet definiteness (if
you see my point) becomes even more apparent in the art symbol
itself.

Langer thinks that an artwork, or •expressive form" as she

calls it, like the metaphor that expresses a more indefinite aspect
of experience, expresses hUJD.an feeling. In her framework, the
artwork is a type of symbol that captures an aspect of human

experience that could not be expressed adequately through other

forms of representation. In her words: "[a symbol) formulates the
appearance of feeling, of subjective experience • • • which

discourse • • • is peculiarly unable to articulate.•3 This claim,

first made in Feeling and Form, seems to imply, at first glance,

that the artwork-symbolizes some definite thing beyond itself. This
is not at all Langer's point, however. In her view the work itself
represents feeling in a way that can not be understood outside of

the work itself. Though the import is not a physical quality of the

artwork, Langer thinks we experience it as if it were. Thinking

about my experience with art, this claim seems at least partially
accurate.

I think specifically about a painting I saw in the

Birmingham Museum of Art while I was waiting for the train that

would take me to New York and the research which awaited me. The
painting, by Inness, is called •Moonlight in Virginia•. The

painting depicts a several trees bare of leaves silhouetted by a
3 Ibid, 244.
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setting moon. In the foreground a women is cooking over a campfire.

The Glc>minant feature of the painting is the tension that exists

between the cool, blue moonlight that covers the landscape and warm

firelight reflected on the hands and face of the woman. The tension

between the light sources goes beyond simply being different colors

and brightness. Instead it evokes a sort of tension between the
starkness of the night and the warlll protection of a fire. This

tension is the import. Is not a physical quality of the work, but

it is experienced as if it were.

This is a good way to begin to talk about the import; in

some very real sense it is experienced as if it were a quality of
the artwork. The analyses I offered in the last section suggested
that talking about the iaport of the artwork is something like

talking about the-qualities or structure of the work in�•question.
The metaphysical question about the location of the import still

stands, though. Langer's description of the way we experience the

import appears accurate, but it is not clear how this experience is

related to her ontic claim as to the location of the import of the
artwork. We experience the import as a physical quality of the

artwork, and Langer wants to say this is because the physical form

of the artwork causes this experience. The import for Langer, then,
seems to be something like a non-physical property of the artwork.
It seems to me that this sort of view neglects some

important aspects of our experience of the artwork. If the artistic

import is in some way completely embodied in the artwork itself we

are left wondering why certain artworks seem to have more •life•
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for us than others. If, as Langer suggests, what is good art

depends solely on how well the artist expresses her feeling, then

it seems that all good artworks should appeal to us. This, though,

is not the case. There are a great many works of art that would be

considered good according to Langer's criterion, and yet the number
of works I find personally compelling remain relatively small. To

restate the point, if the artistic import--that is the feeling or

life of the work--is embodied in the work itself then it appears an

observation of a good artwork would necessarily entail the
experience of this import.

Similarly, it seems different observers would experience the

import of the artwork in a similar if not identical fashion. They

might call the emotive content of the work different things, as

Langer suggests in Feeling and Form� but�·this is because of the

trouble involved with discursively expressing a feeling. In short,

Langer's view is inadequate to understand the role of the observer

in the esthetic experience.

The observer is treated by Langer as a

sort of blank canvas upon which the import of the artwork paints a
indefinite and yet knowable self-portrait. This view does not take

into account the way the experiences of the observer seem to shape

the import of the artwork.

I think Langer'• notion that our experience of the import is

like the experience of a physical quality is useful, but a theory
placing the import wholly in the artwork seems to be problematic.

There is certainly something that artists and observers alike refer

to as the life of the work which defies being described as only a
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quality of the work itself.

The question becomes •What exactly is this import then if it

is not just a quality of the artwork1• Langer describes our

experience of the import and suggests that it is dependent upon the
artwork. But she also seems to edge up on the idea that perhaps

the experience of the import is not solely constituted of an overly

simple perception of the artwork. The notion that the import is not
an actual quality of the work and yet is experienced as if it were

suggests to me that the role of the observer is more complex than a
simple receptor of the artistic import. A look at Collingwood will,
I think, yield both a position more inclusive of the observer and

more problems to be considered.

II. R.G. Collingwood
Collingwood focuses almost exclusively on the artist, and

this is no wonder as his theory is founded upon the idea of

artistic inspiration. According to hi.Jll, the artistic process begins

when the artist has an eaotional experience that compels some sort
of expression. Just what.type of experience might compel

expression, and what actually happens in the process of expression

is quite involved for Collingwood, but its essence is all that is
necessary here. In some sense, the expression of the emotional

state is something that the artist is not fully in control of. Its

expression, then, is a product of and intertwined with the artist's
attempt to understand her own emotions. Part of this process

26

involves using the imagination in order to both understand the
emotional state and express it. The success of being able to

express the emotion is linked fundamentally to understanding it;

when one understands the emotional state, one is able to express

it. It is important to realize that this process is entirely in the
mind of the artist at this point.

Art, as Collingwood points out, must then be a product of

both expression and imagination. But what sort of thing, he asks

himself, is both expressive and imaginative? His answer: language.

According to Collingwood, art is not just similar to language, it
is language. And we can see just how this notion fits into the
above summary. Just as we might formulate some linguistic

representation of an idea and choose not to speak it, so the
process of artistic creation seems to be, for the most part,
something that-o�cur-s·-w-i-thin- the head o'f the artist--acfuar

production of an artwork is not necessary.

The reasons that one might actually express the imagination

manipulated emotional state are several, and the particular one

that motivates the particular expression deteraines the type of art

produced. Expression just for the sake of expression seems to be
the highest form of art, while expression in order to produce

feelings in others and for more utilitarian purposes rank lower on
the scale. Regardless of the motivation for the expression though,

the linguistic characterization of art is completed. That is,

whenever observers observe, what they are receiving is something
like a symbolic representation of the artist's emotional state.
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Collingwood's role for the observers of the artwork is remarkably

similar to the role of the artist--only reversed. The observer is

to see the artwork and be compelled to experience the same sort of

emotion that the artist has, thereby completing the communication.
The central problems in Collingwood's esthetics are, I

think, embodied in the exposition above, and they become apparent
when one begins to wonder just where the artwork itself fits into
this schema. In what I find to be a disturbing paragraph,

Collingwood begins to address this question. •Expression creates a
deposit of habits in the agent, and of by-products in his world,

these habits and by-products become things utilizable by himself

and others for ulterior ends• (275). The uncomfortable feeling that
he may be referring to an artwork as a by-product of the artistic

process is confirmed. Art (language)-is itself only the activity of

expression, and therefore is not utilizable for anything. To

realize it in a form that can be used, it must become •denatured•;
language becomes denatured in speech and art becomes denatured in
its physical expression. The artworks, than, are the •deposits,

left by linguistic activity: the habit of uttering certain words or
phrases; the habit of making certain kinds of gesture, together
with the kinds of audible noise, colored canvass, and so forth.

.

.

.• There is something amiss here.

I wonder what Collingwood aight say about my analysis and

various musings on the cello concerto. First I formed what might be
called an interpretation of the piece, describing the evolving

relation between the cello and orchestra. Later, I focused on the
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images which the piece evoked in me the first few times I listened

to it. In terms of what Collingwood thinks an art observer should
be experiencing, this sort of reaction is the •correct• one. He
would say that my observation of the artwork had brought me in

contact with the import that the artist had intended. My experience

of the artwork, Collingwood would say, was like looking through a

window into the artists mind. There is a problem here, though. The
two types of account of the import I have given seem to be

completely bound to MY experience. So far as I know, Dvorak did not

write the cello concerto while thinking about a picnic in the

mountains, and my particular formulation ot the relation between

cello and orchestra seeas strongly influenced by other things that
I have been thinking about lately.

The essence of Collingwood's thought is that the import

of the artwork is conceived by the artist and transmitted through

the artwork into the observer. I have just suggested, though, that

apparently my experience of the artwork is bound up in my general

experiences. This raises the problea of different interpretations

of an artwork. Collingwood would have to admit that in listening to

the cello concerto, a group of people would describe the work as

having evoked very different images in all of them--different in

the way they are all foraulated in teDl8 of the experiences of the
observers; I think of the mountains when I hear the concerto, you
might think of the ocean. Similarly, our interpretations will be

formulated in terms of p�ttems that we recognize. I see the

concerto as being the separation/union/separation import because I
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am thinking about this paper which describes the relation of the
artwork and observer in a similar way. You would probably see it

differently. Collingwood, has two options for a response to this.
The first of these I will reject out of hand as a not very

interesting notion of art, the second seems to me to include an

idea which will become fundamentally important in the next chapter.
Collingwood could make the claim that there is indeed one

right experience of the artwork, and any other interpretation is

simply wrong. This would imply, though, that the interpretation of
art that has gone on for centuries is mostly misguided. What we

really need to do is find the true interpretation of a piece--true

in the sense that it reflects the import constructed by the artist
-and then leave the piece to similarly conquer others. Before

reading a poem I might .look in a book of accepted interpretations

in order to know wha� sort of experience the piece should give me.
The work of diligent literature scholars would be obviated by a
simple interview with the artist as thi• appears to be the most
direct way of apprehending the import of the work.

Though simple enough, this idea is problematic. Artworks

created by silent artists would be almost useless--not knowing what

sort of experience they intended, we would not know the right

experience to have. Talking to artists would also reveal that, for
the most part, they are not very aware of exactly what they are
representing--if this means being able to formulate their

inspiration in words. The artworks we could be sure we were

experiencing correctly would be limited to those few unusually
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articulate artists who are self-conscious about what it is they are

doing and who think they can represent discursively what they are
doing in their art. Accessible art has then dwindled to an

unacceptable few pieces.

Another way of approaching Collingwood'& ideas would be to

say that each of these interpretations has some element of

•rightness• to it. This claim might take a number of forms. Perhaps
all the interpretations of the artwork taken together adequately

describe the import--like putting together the pieces of a puzzle.

Or, each of the interpretations has something like a grain of truth
to it, and the goal of scholarly interpretation of art is to both
generate new descriptions and at the same time find the bits and

pieces of correctness in each description to be assembled into a
complete description; something like theory and meta-theory. or,
and I think most interestingly, perhaps these different

descriptions are all really accurate descriptions of the import,
but they are given in teras of the context of the observer's

general experience. The import llight be represented in each of the
descriptions of the artwork in the language of the observer's

general experience. Langer seems to be saying something like this

when she talks about how the import of a piece is often described

in different ways because what reminds one of •wistfulness• might
remind another of •longing.•

I have suggested that my experience of the artwork is a sort

of blending of other experiences I have had, but recognize now the
emergence of an important problem. Under Collingwood's system the
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import of the artwork seemed to be some definite indivisible

entity. That is, he thinks that the import travels from the mind of
the artist, through the material of the artwork and into the mind

of the observer without altering its "nature". I have begun to move
away from this, though, and the second set of possibilities I

presented Collingwood with were increasingly more tolerant of a

less definite import. By this I mean the import is increasingly

becoming more dependant upon the observer's experience. The problem
comes if this movement is taken too far. If the import of the

artwork becomes utterly dependant upon the observers experience,

then the artwork has again vanished--thia time into the mind of the

observer; we then begin to wonder whether the observer is just

inclined to have certain sorts of experiences and happens to have

them while they are observing the �rtwork. The one true import that
Collingwood posited has__then.. disintegrated into a myriad- of- -· --- groundless interpretations that seem entirely dependant upon the

observer and consequently ignore the artwork.

This raises the question of just what counts as a good

interpretation of an artwork. Given the observer-dependant esthetic
which I have just described it seems that we have the opposite

extreme from Collingwood's position. Instead of a very definite
artistic import, we are left with an import that is apparently

dependant upon what the observer thinks it is. But is this really
the case? The question to ask in order to answer this question is

not whether we can come to the •right• interpretation, but instead
to think about the possibility of a •wrong• interpretation. Can
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there be a wrong interpretation of an artwork? And if so, what

might it mean to be •wrong•? Even though I am inclined to accept
the observer-dependant notion of import above, there needs to be

something added to this notion to make a complete description. A
recognition of what it means to be a wrong interpretation is in
order.

A mistaken interpretation of an artwork is one that fails

to recognize the intrinsic character of the artwork itself. This

sounds a bit simple, but I think that looking at a specific example

of art will support this claim. If someone were to suggest that the

cello concerto reminded them of a friendly conversation they had in

a quiet coffee house--and only this--I would say that they were

ignoring the vast chords that are so important a part of the piece.
They would be ignoring a fundamental aspect of the artwork, and

would thereby be giving a mistaken interpretation. It seems that;

in whatever form. it takes in a particular interpretation, the cello
concerto's life depends upon the tension between the cello and the
orchestra, and an accurate interpretation is one that takes this

into account.

This begins to sound quite siailar to Collingwood's notion

of the definite import. Might we not say, then, that the import is
this abstract notion of tension? This is to confuse the relation

between the particular good interpretations and what it is they
have in common. When we say that the abstracted notion of the

import is more accurate than the particular instances from which it
is abstracted, we are assuming that by elevating it to a higher
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level we are escaping from the inexactitude of the particulars. In

some sense we feel that the abstracted import is •accurate• because
it seems to be what is common among all the interpretations. But
this commonality seems to me not something that is somehow more

•right• than the particulars, but instead something that owes its
existence to the particulars and so is subordinate to their

content. The abstracted import is not exempt from inexactitude--it

is a product of it. The abstracted import is itself given to being

stated in numerous •right• ways, and these numerous way are the
particular interpretations themselves.

As I supposed when taking up Collingwood's work, the import

is experienced as a formulation of the observer's general

experience, but this experience is not one of radical subjectivity
-the artwork constrains what might be_a •right• interpretation.
This seems to have-been-what -Langer was pointing at when she

described the import as being experienced as a quality of the work,
even though it is not. Things are beginning to take shape now.

After looking at Langer and Collingwood neither the notion that the
import is a quality of the physical thing we call the artwork, nor

that it is a quality of the observer's experience seems acceptable.
The word •import• is itself becoming less useful as it seems

essentially a word concerned with quality.

III. John Dewey
I turn to Dewey's view last as it is the one I find most
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sympathetic. In reading it again, I have been reminded why I have
been drawn to Art as Experience so strongly. It remains, in my

opinion, one of the most subtle and accurate descriptions of what

must paid attention to in the esthetic experience. I say this in
this manner because this most recent reading of the first few
chapters of Art as Experience has left me with the increasing

feeling that Dewey recognized something in the experience of art

which had been neglected throughout the history of esthetics. The

idealist notions of art--a la Collingwood--seea to bother Dewey as

much as they do me, and the main thrust of his work seems to be an
attempt to make a more balanced esthetic theory--balanced in

thesense of recognizing the artist, artwork and observer as all
being important.

On the other hand, it seems to •e that Dewey, despite his

resistance to its pull, is drawn into thinking about art in much

the same way as those he was reacting against. Be wants to support
the idea that art is a relation, but it is not clear that the

relation Dewey marks out is not itself something like an idea in

the mind of the observer. Though he differs froa Collingwood

importantly, his position, in my view, ends up making the import of
the artwork an idea--much as Collingwood did. This is all quite

broad, and Dewey's ideas, because they have in many ways influenced
my thinking, need to be considered more carefully.

Dewey's ideas about the nature of the esthetic experience

are an extension of his notions about experience in general, and it

is with these more general ideas that I will begin. In contrast to
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an idealist framework like Collingwood's, Dewey is concerned about
the interaction of the organism and the environment with which it

interacts. This interaction is experience, and it is this notion of
interaction that I see as the most important idea in Dewey's work.

For the most part, the other thinkers I have considered have held a
very simple and inaccurate notion of perception--I talked about

Langer's idea of perception being &Olllething like the world painting
its picture on the canvasses of our lllind. Dewey, on the other hand,

is interested in the way perception seems to be something more like

communication between the experiencing organism and the surrounding
environment. Unlike the passive receptor of stimuli that both

Langer and Collingwood suggeat, Dewey's living organism is in a

constant state of receiving information about the environment and
processing this inforaation in such a way as to influence the
continuing experience.

Experience for Dewey, then, seems to have two interwoven

components. The experiencing organi- is involved both in a passive

receiving of input from. the environment--what Dewey refers to as
•undergoing.• Unlike the idealists, though, Dewey also wants to

include an active element to experience. The •doing• of experience

seems to be something like our consciously establishing relations

between the disparate parts of our experience. As observers we are
constantly arranging our experience into coherent patterns that

give order to our interaction with the world. We seek to make the
differing components of our experience •fit together• to form
coherent •wholes.•
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Dewey rejects the idealist notion of experience, then,

because he sees it as taking hold of either of the two aspects of
experience to the exclusion of the other. On one hand we might

establish an over-attention to the •underqoinq• aspect of

experience. An overly passive observer of this sort would just

focus on receiving impressions of the artwork, not upon forming

these impressions into any cohesive whole. Thus experience never

has a chance to develop any sort of coherence, remaining something

like a stream of sensory impressions. on the other hand we have an

overemphasis on •doing.• In this case the observer does not pay

enough attention to the impressions he receives from the world, but
instead ia continuously putting together ideas. The problem, then,

is not allowing a certain amount of •undergoing• in order to see

how these constructions relate to the experiences which generated
them.

Having these two elements in balance in our experience is,

according to Dewey, not the reqular state of affairs. As often as
not we, like the idealists, focus on one or the other of the two,
and because of this our experience often lacks a sense of

completion. Achieving this balance Dewey calls having .AN

experience. In contrast with our normal flow of experience which

tends toward either of the two extremes, AN experience stands out
in our llind as a period of time in which we were able to both

observe the unfolding of events and organize these events into a

cohesive whole--.AN experience which is coherently made up of the
various elements of experience.
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It is no wonder that Dewey connects this notion of AN

experience with the esthetic. He understands the interaction of a

good artist, artwork, and observer as a situation that is likely to

bring about AN experience on the part of both artist and observer.
Taking a very pragmatic position, Dewey understands the drive to

produce art as the conscious intent to form ordinary unbalanced

experience into a cohesive whole: into AN-experience. As he says,
•art is the living and concrete proof that man is capable of

restoring consciously • • • the union of sense • • and action."4 The

experience of an artwork has the elements of doing and undergoing
described above. As observers we are engaged in both passive

receptivity of the content of the artwork, and active structurinq

of what we are observing. Lest this sound too simple, these

processes are intertwined. our receptivity is influenced by what we
are structuring the experience in our llind, and our structuring is

influenced by what is there in our immediate experience. This whole
process of doing-undergoing continues until we reach the conclusion

of the experience, a break that Dewey feels is quite distinct. In a
sense, it is this definite break at the end of AN experience that

gives it the character of standing out from our ordinary

experience. Both the nature of the break, and the way Dewey thinks
it individualizes the esthetic experience need to be examined.

It is clear that Dewey means to distinguish AN experience

from experience in general, and in making this claim to distinguish
4 Dew•y, John. ai:t 1• J:xperi•D'11• New York: P•rigree, 1934.
p25.
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himself from the idealist position. In this overview of Dewey's

thoughts we can distinguish two important ideas that Dewey supposes

will separate AN experience from experience in general. First,

Dewey focuses on the •doing-undergoing•, when balanced, as being a
distinguishing aspect of AN experience. second, he thinks that the
character of the esthetic experience, in contrast to ordinary

experience and because of the •doing-undergoing• has a distinct
quality of consummation or completeness that separates it from

•anesthetic• experience. The •doing-undergoing• which supports a

feeling of completeness is what Dewey thinks gives the experience

of the artwork, and AN experiences in general, the individual or
distinct character that our esthetic experiences seem to have.
We might first ask Dewey how his doing-undergoing is

different from the way other esthetic theories treat the artwork
and observer. I suggested earlier that Langer thought of the

observer of an artwork as something like a white canvas which the

artwork impressed its image. This sort of blank canvas observer is
overly simple, and I think that Dewey's •doing-undergoing• is an

attempt to say something more accurate about this. Dewey's notion

of •doing-undergoing• supports something like communication between
the artwork and the observer. The observer of the artwork is both
passively perceiving the forms on the canvas or chords in the

concerto, and actively sorting and connecting these forms in her
head to create comprehensive ideas inspired by the primary

observation. Dewey does not want this process to be understood as a
simple exchange, or a single occurrence. Rather, this communication
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between the artwork and observer is a continually evolving process.
The observer is continuously taking in the work and formulating

ideas about it.

Dewey uses an example of a stone rolling down a hill to

illustrate the difference between experience and AN experience. A
stone rolling down a hill without awareness of its descent or its
eventual resting place might represent experience. A conscious

stone that is enjoying the bumps and dips of downhill travel, and
has some sort of control over where it will come to rest, is .AN

experience. We might ask ourselves, though, how much control the

rock rolling down the hill does have over where it comes to rest.

In other words, what sort of doing is this here? If we say that our

unfolding experience is in some way guided by an end we have pre

determined, it seelll8 we are back to Collingwood and the problem of

the vanishing artwork. our experience is then the product of the
idea we begin with. If the end of our experience is unknown,

though, it seems that •doing• has disappeared. We are back to being
rocks rolling, attentively perhaps, but with no active involvement
in the progress of the experience--we are back to Langer's notion
of the observer being like a canvas.

This problem becomes evident in Dewey's work in the second

way he thinks he has distinguished hiaself from the idealists: his

n otion of consummation. Upon reaching the end of the period of
doing-undergoing, Dewey thinks we can look back over the

conversation between artwork and observer and see all the minute
steps of doing and undergoing as having been moving toward the
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finality we have reached. In a sense, the individual doings and

undergoings become parts of the complete experience, and it is this
sense of completion that separates the experience from what he

calls anesthetic experience.

It seems to me, though, that this reliance upon the

consummated end of experience to separate it from anesthetic

experience is what has caused the problea in the rolling stone

case. If the experience is building to an end which will subsume

the individual steps in the experience into a greater whole, we are
faced with the question the stone example raised: is this end

something we observers are working toward, or is it something

within the artwork that is drawing us to this finality? Dewey's

claim that it is both--that the esthetic experience is both doing

and undergoing-- is one I fully agree with. However, I do not think

this doing-undergoing will produce the consummated end he suggests.
Given the nature of the import as I have begun to describe it, the
experience of the import will always be one of incompleteness--in

the sense that we do not ever seem to be able to say the last word

about the artwork. In taking up the •other• in the next chapter, I
will say more about why this must be so.

In essence, all three thinkers have a notion of the end of

esthetic experience much like Dewey's. Langer assumes when we

recognize the import in the artwork an end is reached; the end is
the transmission of the form for Collingwood. The end of Dewey's

esthetic experience is achieved after a period of relation between

the artwork and observer. In all these cases, the full character of
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the esthetic experience is not evident until it is over--until the
import is received by the observer.

Indeed the word import seems

to imply something like a quality that, once located or
transmitted, is very definite.

It is this notion of the end I will disagree with, and an

alternative account of our experience of the artwork has been
formulating in my discussion of these three thinkers. Hy

consideration of Langer left me with the idea that the import of

the artwork is not just a quality of the artwork, though it is

experienced as if it were. This led ae to look to Collingwood for a

more involved observer, and I found the general experiences of the
observer to be fundamentally important to the esthetic experience.

Dewey provided the basis for understanding the relation between
observer and artwork.

In a sense, our questions Jllirror those of the Stevens poem.

On the one hand •It may be that in all her phrases stirred/ The

grinding water and the gasping wind;/ But it was she and not the

sea we heard.• On the other •And when she sang, the sea,/ Whatever
self it had became the self/ that waa her song !or she was the

maker." The answer to the questions about the nature of the import,
like the one in the poem, lies in the tension between these two

possibilities.
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Chapter 3

THATness and the Other

Relation in Esthetic .Experience
But it waa more than that
More even than her voice, and ours among
The meaningless plunging• of water and the wind
Theatrical distances, bronze shadows heaped
On high horizons, mountainous atmospheres

Of aky and•••

I. Import and Ends

The last chapter concluded with the observation that the

idea of "import• implied a definiteness in our experience of the

artwork, and that upon coming to this definiteness, an end is
reached--the import is known and the experience is over.

In some

sense this is how we often think of what it means to experience

art, we observe an artwork and come to some sort of decision as

to what it is "about.• Think of reading a book. One motivation
for reading is to try to discover what a book is "about.• Once we

know this, we might be inclined to say an end has been reached

with the import having been discovered and understood. This is

apparently what Langer was describing when she said the import

was experienced as if it were a quality of the work; when we

reach some understanding of the meaning of a book, we might want

to say that the meaning is in some sense there in the boot.

But what of this notion of an end? In the first chapter, I

talked a bit about THATness, and I would like to retum to it

now. The first time I used the word •THATness•, quite a while
ago, I described it in the context of the experience of stumbling
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upon a rock unexpectedly, and I want to keep this sense of
immediacy. In the context of esthetics I have been using THATness

to refer to the sort of rough jarring we receive when we
recognize the artwork is not captured by our descriptions of it.

This jarring is as pronounced as our surprise in stumbling upon

the unexpected rock; the artwork surprises us by being other than
what we have expected it to be.

It seems as if, at least on the face of it, the THATness in

esthetic experience is opposed to the sort of end

"import"

suggests. As long as we are experiencing THATness, we are aware

that we have not reached a description of the artwork that fully
captures it. can a theory which holds the consummated end of the

esthetic experience as fundamental take account of THATness as

well? Dewey's notion of the relation between the artwork and

observer attempts to do something like this. If we understand the

doing as the formation of descriptions of the artwork,

then

THATness lliqht be the point at which something in the artwork

forces the observer to realize the descriptions which have been

fo:rmed are inaccurate. THATness could be the turning point from
doing

to

undergoing.

THATness

would

be

the

point

in

the

conversation when the artwork begins to speak and compels the
observer to silence and attention. The end would be reached,

then,

when the observer reaches a description which is not

contradicted by the artwork. Looking back on the conversation,

then, the observer could see that it had been leading to this

point all along. The artwork had been correcting his misguided
descriptions until an accurate one was reached.
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We would do well to ask ourselves what •accurate• might mean

here, though. In my discussion of Collingwood, I pointed out how

we are inclined to recognize the abstract generalizations about

an artwork as being the most accurate. Thus the concrete images

that the concerto evoked seemed less accurate than the abstract
description I gave of the piece (separation/ union/ separation).

But should we say that this abstract understanding of the artwork
is accurate, and by being so obviates THATness? I do not think

so. Once we have reached the rarified air of this sort of
description,

profoundly

the

missed.

artwork,
As

I

far

from

pointed

being

out

captured,

earlier,

this

seems
sort

description is, by its nature, categorical and can refer to any

number of silllilar artworks. If the end Dewey thinks we reach is
this sort of description, the artwork might respond by pointing
to the way the abstract description misses- its· complexity. - The

abstract description, by its nature, has missed the way in which

this artwork is different fro• any other. In the formulation of
this abstract description which appears to be the final summation

of the esthetic experience, THATnesa is most pronounced.

The artwork seems to be fundamentally indeterminate--it

resists our attempts to determine it. We are inclined to say that

the particular images it evokes do not fully capture it as they
are images formed of our own personal experience. When we try to

abstract the essence of these images in the attempt to produce a

more accurate description, though, the result is an even larger

gap between the artwork and our ideas about it. The end suggested
by the word •import• is misguided, then, as it suggests that upon
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understanding the artwork·this gap will be bridged; we will come
to a description which will determine the experience of the
artwork fully. This sort of end will not be found.

The account of the artwork needed is one that makes a place

for both the relational character of my interaction with the
artwork, and the way in which the indeterminacy of the artwork
prevents any completely determinate end from being reached, an
account that provides a place for both our interpretations and
THATness. In taking a closer look at THATness we will begin to
find a place for an account that will take both of these into
consideration.

II. THATness
a. The Unexpected and THATness

I wonder how Dewey would account for what we might call the

feeling

of

the

•unexpected•

that

seems

to

characterize

my

experience of music. When I listen to certain pieces of ausic I
often find myself swept along. I feel the natural progression of
the piece and I find myself anticipating, with a fairly high
accuracy,

where

the

piece

will

go.

If

I

hear

the

gentle

interchange between the cello and the orchestra and observe that
the music is building in intensity I expect that this will
continue to some sort of release of this intensity. It seems that

being able to appreciate good music is being able to recognize
and follow these increases in intensity and their corresponding

resolution. Then, just as I am expecting an intimate passage to
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continue its present path of intimacy, the music makes a radical

jump into broad inhuman chords--the beginning of the second

movement of the cello concerto.

This turn of the music is

radically other than what I have expected, and the experience of
it disrupts what I have expected the piece to do and, in a sense,

leads me back to paying attention to the music rather that my
expectations about it.

Unexpectedness seems to be the key to understanding Dewey's

•doing-undergoing.• While listening to music the doing might be

understood as forming expectations about the music in the sense

that I have described above. When we expect the music to do a
certain thing, we are putting together our ideas about the piece

and creating expectations about what the rest of the piece should
do. We have heard the cello run through this particular scale and

end with a flourish three times so far, and we expect the

flourish when the scale begins a fourth time. The ideas we have

formed, our expectations, make up the doing. Undergoing, on the

other

band,

is

highlighted

when

we

come

up

against

the

unexpected. Often, our doing results in ideas about the piece

that are contradicted by the piece; we expect the flourish the

forth run up the scale but this time the cello is silenced--we
experience the unexpected. With the experience of the unexpected

we realize that our expectations are not the piece itself, the

piece is something other than our thoughts about it. We return to

undergoing after our expectations are left unfulfilled. Once
again,

this process seems to be made much more distinct in

talking about it than it is in experience. Hy experience of the
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unexpected is not remarkable in any large sense, instead it is

the result of my ongoing expectations about the path of the music

on the very particular level that careful listening entails.

Talking about unexpectedness is one way of getting to the

more abstract notion I have in mind: the notion of THATness. If

the experience of the unexpected in music is a result of my
expectations of the piece on a minute scale, then the experience
of THATness is much the same experience on a more general level,

though it encompasses unexpectedness. The experience of THATness
is the feeling I have when my formal ideas about the artwork,

which have been inspired by the artwork,

fail to grasp the

totality of the artwork. The notions I have about the formal
nature of the piece fall far short of totally describing the

work. The full character of the work resists being formulated as
a

particular

set

of

juxtaposition of ideas etc.

relations,

arrangement

of

forms,

The cello concerto, and my descriptions of it provide the

setting in which my experience of THATness can be recognized.

Though I have dealt with the abstract analysis first in these

pages, it was, of course, the images evoked by the piece that
were primary in my experience.

Ny first impression of the

concerto was the image of the mountain setting. At that stage I

might have said that the work was about a picnic in the
mountains. As I listened to the piece again, though, this image
lost its structuring effect. The more I listened, the less I was

able to hear the piece just in terms of a picnic in the mountains

as my continued experience of it led me to recognize elements in
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the piece which did not fit this description.
expectations

about

the

flow

of

a

piece

are

Just as my

disrupted

by

unexpected turns in the music, so my notions about the form of

the piece were rendered incomplete or lacking by the recognition

of other elements of the piece not taken in by my immediate
impressions. I found the concerto was not encompassed by my image

of the mountains. The concerto was more than just a picnic in the

mountains.

At this point I thought my description was just lacking; I

had simply stated my idea about the formal nature of the concerto
in too specific language, the description was overly influenced

by my personal experience. To render a more accurate description
of the form I turned to an abstract description which described
the concerto as the relation between the human and the unknown.

That is, I thought that by taking my particular impressions and

seeing what it was they had in common with others I had gathered,

I could formulate a more abstract and accurate notion about the

form of the artwork. The result of this was not what I had
expected. Far from. getting me closer to the actual piece I was

listing to, my abstracted form failed to describe the actual

nature of the piece in as satisfying way as my more particular

example did. Describing the concerto as the interaction between
the human and the unknown,

far froa being a more adequate

description of the piece, seemed to open up even more space

between my ideas about the piece and the piece itself. In m.y
attempt

to

create

a

form

which

captured

the

particular

interaction between cello and orchestra in this concerto,
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I

create an abstract idea which might refer to the Stevens poem as

much as it does the cello concerto. Even :more emphatically this

time, the cello concerto has slipped out of the grasp of my
formal ideas; it has remained other than my thoughts about it.

At the risk of losing the metaphysical thread of the

discussion about the nature of the other, I think a concrete

reference here will help these more abstract points. As I have

suggested,

the

experience

of

THATness

is

related

to

the

unexpectedness I have described above. Just as my expectations of

the continued path of the music are upset by the unexpected turn
it takes, so my formal ideas about the artwork are upset because

the artwork always seems to lie outside my assessment of it. The
result of the feeling of unexpectedness and otherness seems to be
the same: we are forced to stop doing and start undergoing again.

The experience of THATness is the realization that the artwork is
0

not our ideas, it is something outside our head. The experience

of THATness is a bumping up against soaething very real in the

world •out there•. It is not merely our idea, it is THAT.

Implicit in this description are the answers to the most

fundamental questions about the nature of the experience of the

THATness. At this point I see three very important questions.

First, we might ask if THATness is a quality of the artwork in

question. In other words, when we experience THATness are we

experiencing a quality that is eabodied in some way in the

artwork itself? Second, if the answer to the first question is

no, then might the experience of THATness be a product of our

thinking? That is, is THATness a quality of our thought? Or in a
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more particular formulation, Jllight THATness not be our lack of
precision in our appraisal of the artwork? Finally, if the answer

to both of these questions is no, then what exactly is THATness
if not a quality of the artwork or observer's experience?

b. THATness as Quality
In one important sense we might want to say that THATness is

a quality of the artwork. The indeterminacy of the artwork seems
to be the source of my experience of THATness; as the artwork is

fundamentally indeterminate it generates my feeling of THATness

by lying outside my expectations (expectations in the form of the
images it evokes and the descriptions created from these images).

Further, I want to say that we can form wrong interpretations of

the artwork; the indeterminacy does not seem to facilitate being

able to attach just any description to the artwork as I suggested

in my discussion of Collingwood. It makes sense, then, to say
that this indeterminacy which seems to be the root of THATness is

a quality of the work, and our experience of it is the experience
of the other.

We risk two pitfalls here. In one sense, placing THATness as

a quality of the artwork, in the sense I have used THATness so

far, risks understanding the artwork as being a fundamentally

unapproachable individual.

If the artwork is only THAT,

we

quickly find ourselves running out of interesting things to say

about it. The descriptions we give will always be underwritten by
the more fundamental recognition that the artwork has the quality
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of being other than these descriptions; in a sense we see the
artwork

changing

into

an indescribable

black

speck

in

the

distance like the singularity of a black hole which sucks up any
sort of illumination thrown on it.

Finding ourselves in this

position we are inclined to make the second mistake; since it

seems that all artworks have this character, we might group them
together under the common heading of •THATS.• As Hegel did with

•this,• we have taken the THATness which seemed to be the mark of

confrontation with the individual and turned it into the most

abstract

of

categories--everything

can

be

understood

as

a

"this•. 1 This is unacceptable though. It seems that we can both

give an accurate and interesting account of the artwork and
recognize

the

artwork

as

instantiation of a category.

being

something

more

than

an

What is needed is an account of THATness that takes into

consideration both its relation to indeterminacy and the way in

which we might say a description of an artwork is •right.•

Another possible way of doing this aight be to say that THATness

is a quality of my experience of the artwork; THATness might in

some way be dependent upon my particular understanding of the

artwork.

If my description of the artwork is in some sense

deficient, perhaps THATness might be the my recognition that I
have made a mistake--that my description is not a good one.

To understand why this cannot be the case, think again about

1 Regal, G. w. P. Thi Phonmaonotocn .ot spirit;. tran■• A.v.
Killer. oxford: Oxford u. Presa, 1977. Hegel'•
treatment of •thia• i• found at the and of the Sense
certainty ■action.
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the idea of unexpectedness. Would we say that the feeling of

shock we receive when the music goes in a direction we do not

expect is a quality of our ideas about the piece? This does not

seem right. our expectations of the music and the way they are

wrong gives rise to the feeling of the unexpected in that the
unexpectedness

is

just

the

recognition

of

their

lack

of

fulfillment. But the unexpected is not itself an idea; quite to

the contrary it is the recognition that our expectations are

unfulfilled. It is a recognition that marks the (temporary) end

of expectations and a return of focus to the artwork itself--as
something that has eluded expectations. Quite distinct from the

reco(Jllition of a quality of my thought, THATness is the awareness
of

soaething

lying outside ay

expectations.

It

ia

in

the

experience of the THATness that I recognize the concrete, not the
abstract; it is in this recognition that I realize what it is my

abstractions refer to and the necessarily incomplete way in which

they refer.
So,

I am left in a quandary.

The THATness which is a

fundamental part of my esthetic experience is neither a quality

of the artwork nor my ideas about it. So where might THATness be,

and what is it? It is in the relation between the artwork and
observer that we will begin to find an answer to these questions,

though not the sort of answer one usually relies on relation to
give. Looking at how THATness arises from the interaction of the

artwork and observer will begin to get us to the notion of the

"other.• With this "other" I think some of the questions about

THATness will begin to be resolved.
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From what I have said above about the metaphysical status of

THATness we might be tempted to think that its origin is a rather

simple exchange between observer and artwork. If THATness is only
the failure of my formal ideas to completely describe the

artwork, then the situation looks something like this: I see the

artwork and have an idea, the idea does not completely describe
the artwork so I experience THATness. This is too simple, though.

In order to describe the complexity of the experience of the

artwork this notion of what it means to interact with an artwork

must be left behind in favor of a richer notion of interaction.

c. THATness and Relation
I have stated that THATness must be the result of a relation

between

the

artwork

and

the

observer,

but

the

notion

of

interaction which I have so far is not much of a relation--at

least on the face of it. This is the notion that THATness is the

recognition that our ideas about the artwork do not completely

determine or describe it. THATness is the point at which it

becomes apparent to us that there is something outside our ideas

which they refer to. The feeling of THATness is the jerk of the

unexpected, the bumping into something there in the world outside

our head. So how might one say that this harsh stop in our
thinking is the product of a relation? To answer this we must go

back to thinking about the nature of the artwork and the way in

which our formal ideas relate to it.

In my discussion of Collingwood I pointed out bow the
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artwork

seems

to

be

something

that

accepts

a

variety

of

interpretations of its formal structure. Ne can understand the

artwork in a number of ways, and with good art this seems to be
the necessary state of affairs. I see a particular relation of
ideas in the Steven's poem, and you might see a quite different

one. In addition, I pointed out how the form of the artwork,

while being indefinite in the sense that it is not confined to
one

interpretation,

seems

to

be

resistant

to

•bad•

interpretations. Ne can say a good deal about what the poem might

mean, and we can say that certain interpretations are not what it

means. The essential point here is that the artwork is very much

the generator of our ideas about it. As I have suggested, our
ideas about the artwork are made up of parts of our more general
experience,

but

the

artwork

itself

is

what

calls

these

experiences to mind. In the case of the poem I am reminded of

what it is like to wonder about boundaries, and this experience

of wondering is given coherence by the interaction of the singer

and the sea.

But how is it that the artwork brings about the union of ay

disparate experiences? In my observation I see the interaction of

forms within the artwork and these forms are such that they
remind me of experiences I have had and things I have thought.

•she sang beyond the genius of the sea• brings to lllind a

beautiful voice and the sound of water, and •1t was her voice

that made the sky acutest at its vanishing• reminds me of the

part we take in drawing boundaries in the world. The coexistence

of these lines in the poem might lead me to formulate an
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interpretation of the poem as being about a woman drawing the
boundaries in the world.

The first few stanzas support this interpretation, and I

become more comfortable with this idea.

I expect that the

remainder of the poem will describe her voice as the creative
force behind the boundaries. Then I hear, •eut it was more than

that, more even than her voice • • • • A harsh chord sounds that

breaks the inertia of my expectations. Suddenly, the music has

eluded the interpretation I have given it. I am no longer seeing
the music in relation to this interpretation, I am bumping into

it. Instead of drifting along with my description of the poem in

mind I am left in direct confrontation with the way it has shown
itself to be other than my thoughts about it.

I continue to read with just the play of words in mind, and

the recognition that the poem is not just about a woman making

boundaries. It is more than that. Perhaps it is something like

the relation between the singer and the sea that makes the

boundaries. A new interpretation begins to fora based on the

failure of the first and the feeling that both singer and sea
have something to do with the boundary creation. But then •rt was

her voice that made the sky acutest at its vanishing • • • and when

she sang, the sea, whatever self it had, became the self that was

her song.• Once again I am left with the recognition that my
interpretation of the poem is lacking. The poea haa othered
itself out of the grasp of my expectations.
Now we

can see

this

conversation between

artwork and

observer must be an ongoing relation, rather than a one time
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interaction. As I pointed out in my thoughts about Collingwood,

the ideas that the artwork inspires in us, the expectations we

form, the meanings we ascribe to it, will always lead to THATness
as these things will never encompass the entirety of the artwork.

We will never come to a set of expectations,

or particular

interpretation which will eliminate the THATness of our relation

with the artwork. The artwork, by its nature, will continue to
stand outside our ideas about it. The attempt to define it in
terms of our thoughts will always lead to THATness. The artwork

is the genesis of our ideas, but it stands outside of them in way

that compels us to extend our intellectual grasp in an attempt to

make a better description--a more accurate grasp.

It is this that compels in the artwork; we feel that our

ideas and feelings are inspired by the artwork, we feel that we

know what the artwork is •about•, we know what to expect from it.

As soon as we think this though, the artwork eludes our grasp and

we are left with the realization that our ideas, while brought

together by the artwork, do not capture it. In this recognition

we confront the concrete in a direct way. We are no longer

thinking about the world, we are directly aware of it. It is not
the interpretations we bring to the artwork which compel us,

then, it is the way we are drawn to the artwork within the

harshness of THATness. This is the otherness in which we find the
roots of THATness.
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Interlude: The Night

I have always been fascinated with the dark. Since my last

few years in high school I have made periodic pilgrimages to a

quarry pond (the •Blue Hole•, we call it) in the country near

Huntsville, and an unspoken rule among my fellow nutty companions

(the opinion of non-night-travelers) is that we only visit the

place at night. There is something compelling about the night; in

the darkness the ordinary cow-field takes on a misty, dreamlike

character. As in the Stevens poem, our minds are able to draw

boundaries upon the night and for awhile the place is not just a
rural spot in Alabama, it is wherever our minds happen to be

wandering that evening.

When I think of how we lllight say THATness is really the

compelling part of the experience of the artwork, I often think

of nights spent at the pond. We are most often inclined to think
that what is really interesting about art, places, people, etc is

the way in which we can say we know things about them. I think of

the tourist at the Grand Canyon with a guide book in hand, seeing

the awe-inspiring hole in front of hiJll mediated through the voice

of the guidebook. He does not just look at the grandeur, he looks

for landmarks and signs of elevation, and passages taken by (much
more)

brave pioneers.

The Blue Hole at night has no such

guidebook. The faint impressions of trees and hills accept the

interpretations we impress on them. Perhaps on a particular night

we are speaking of the sea, the aist on the water gives the

corner-of-the-eye impression of being on a rocky coast.

But the night resists complete definition. The nearby hills,
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covered with moonlit fog, could as well be distant mountains. The

pine tree on the edge of the field might be a sapling redwood. It

is not what we think these things are that is so compelling, it
is the way in which,
confronting

just

when the mist shifts,

•something•--something

out

we are back to
there

in

the

darkness. And the •somethings• we see are not well defined things
we can now identify correctly, but indefinte shapes which tempt

us to define them and always defy certainty as to what they
"really" are. The forms in the moonlit darkness compel us in

their indeterminacy. When our attempts to define them as one

thing or another fail, we are left confronting them as just

shapes. We are drawn in by the failure, in a sense. When our

definitions--our guidebooks--fail we remove the mediating ideas
from between us and the world about us. We are left with a direct

relation with the fundamentally indeterminate other.

III. THATness and the Other

The relation with the other is the foundation of the

esthetic experience; it is here we !ind the roots of THATness.

The subject of the other is an immense one and here I only to
broach it in order to understand more about THATness.

indebted to work of C. S.
subject,

I am

Peirce in his early work on this

and Brian Martine for distinguishing

relation we have with the other. 2

the

sort

of

2 For Pierce'• contributiona to this discuaaion aee the ■ectiona
on Secondnes■ in Buchler•• Peirce; A Collection.
Martine•• work on the relationship with the other begina in
Indtpl@1biaadyladttyt@alHaiW,Ut.,ond.audJaclic relation used
here occur• pri.Jlarily in tha former.
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We might understand the two aspects of our relation to the

artwork by once again referring to Dewey' a notion of doing

undergoing.

If the doing part of our relationship with the

artwork is the putting together of ideas as I have suggested,

then we might understand our doing as being a mediated relation

to the artwork. We are, in a sense, like the tourist viewing the
Grand

Canyon

through

the

context

of

the

guidebook.

Our

expectations about the artwork mediate our awareness of it. The
attempt in all three of the thinkers I have discussed is to make
this mediating theory in some way encompass the actuality to

which it refers. The end I rejected earlier is the drive to make
the mediating idea map directly onto the artwork. We have seen,

though, the attempt to say exactly the right words in the hopes

the artwork will be captured is necessarily unsuccessful.

It is in the recognition of our unsuccessful attempt to

define the artwork in terms of our mediating interpretation that

we experience THATness. Recognize, as might be apparent, is a

word that does not take in the full import of THATness and the

resulting direct relation to the artwork. I continually want to
come back to more visceral words like •bump into• or •confront.•

The confrontation with the artwork that has eluded our mediating

interpretation is the turning point in the doing-undergoing
schema, but it is not separate from the undergoing. The jarring

stop of THATness is not the mark of anesthetic experience as

Dewey supposed, nor a sign that the esthetic experience has been

completed and that we are aoving away from the artwork. Quite to

the contrary it is the recognition of the more fundamental
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relation to the artwork,
artwork.

the relation that draws us to the

The word •other• as we use it ordinarily, implies a certain

sort of relation. Though usually unstated, •other• is necessarily

conjoined to •than.• •other• implies something that is not this,

and in stating that we are drawing a particular sort of relation

between the •this• and the •other.• Various terms have been used

to refer to this sort of relation: secondness (Peirce) and dyadic
(Martine) are two. The central notion here, though, is that the

relation to the other is an unmediated one. The experience of

THATness marks the recognition that the interpretation which bas

mediated my relation with the artwork is incomplete, and in this
harsh

recognition

I

confrontation with the

have

called

artwork--a

THATness

is

confrontation

the

direct

between

the

observer and the other unmediated by an interpretation. THATness

is the recognition of both the inadequacy of the interpretation
and the underlying relationship with the other.

The •than• implied in the use of •other• gives some insight

into how the other, instead of pushing us away as I suggested it

might if it were a property of the artwork, draws us into the

artwork. When we form interpretations and mediate the relation

with the artwork we are in a sense one step back from it. I am

the tourist with the guidebook. As the artwork others itself from
our

expectations,

though,

we

are

brought

into

direct

confrontation with the artwork. The artwork becomes •other than•

our interpretations of it, and by doing this it draws us into the

dyadic sort of relation in which we are paying attention to the
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artwork itself.

This direct relation with the artwork is not the end of

interpretations of the artwork, then, it is the generator of
them. When we are left in direct confrontation with the other as

my friends and I are when looking at the shapes in the misty

night of the Blue Hole, we are compelled to say something about

this thing which has drawn us to it. We feel compelled for a

variety of reasons

to

attempt

to define this

thing

which

confronts us, and upon saying something about it we are back to
mediating the relation again.

This mediation will again be

disrupted by THATness, of course, and we will become aware of the
dyadic nature of our relation with the other.

The relationship is now satisfyingly complex. The relation

between the observer and the artwork is not a simple notion of
the transmission of form,

or the inspiration of ideas.

The

artwork, as a collection of related forms, inspires in us the

blending of experiences and ideas about what the interaction of

the forms in the artwork could mean. our interpretation or
feeling might be a •right• one, that is it might take the forms

present into account, but with the establishment of our ideas

about the artwork comes the realization that the artwork is not

determined in our interpretations. By the nature of the form of

the artwork, it will never be determined; it will always lie

outside our ideas about it--even though these ideas are inspired
by it. And this elusiveness of the artwork, far from making the

artwork inaccessible to our thoughts,

brings us into direct

confrontation with the artwork itself. Hence the indeterminacy of
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the artwork does not end our interaction with it, it creates it.

The harsh stops in our esthetic experience do not interrupt our

interaction with the artwork, they are the genesis of it.

We can see now that the end reached in the formation of a

description of the artwork is really the beginning of the

relation. In the creation of a mediating theory between artwork

and observer we are beginning the cycle which will lead to a
recognition of the inadequacy of this theory. In our experience

of THATness we are drawn into a direct confrontation with the
artwork which will, in turn, lead us to make another attempt to

capture it in the terms of a theory • .And, thus, a relation. There
is a relation between artwork and its observer all right, but it

is a relation which, by its nature, will not come to a definitive

end with a last word spoken. For in the speaking of this last
word lies the beginning of the relation.

These words I have written here should be taken in much the

same way we might take an interpretation of an artwork. I have

pointed to several aspects of my experience of an artwork, but
these pointings are themselves not an end.

The notions of

THATness and the •other• risk becoming themselves as categorical

as •import" if we are not careful in our considerations. These
ideas are themselves beginnings, and beginnings in a sense that

they take the experience of the artwork out of the fundamentally

determinate setting described by theories supporting the notion

of import. If I have succeeded in doing this, then this project
has been a success.

In closing I am reminded of the last few lines of the
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